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Articles

Heraclitus and 'Knowing Yourself' (116 DK)

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If Stobaeus provides an accurate record, Heraclitus makes the earliest reference to the Delphic 'Know yourself': 'All people have a share in knowing themselves and being sound-minded' (ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι μέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ σωφρονεῖν, fr. 116 DK = Stob. *Flor*. 3.5.6).[1] A serious inquiry into the meaning of this fragment would have a range of benefits. First, it would help clarify the role of self-knowledge (also frr. 45, 101, 115) in coming to know the Heraclitean *logos* (fr. 1). In particular, it might be that by knowing oneself one comes to be 'awake' in the way Heraclitus claims necessary for knowing the *logos*, and thus for having wisdom. Second, it might point toward an intriguing account of epistemic reflexivity and thus even a nascent concept of selfhood, one heretofore obscured by investigations into a putatively material basis of the soul, distinctions between unity-in-diversity and flux theses, and appreciation of Heraclitus' skepticism about the subjective interpretation of personal experience.[2] This account might suggest that recognizing oneself as something that can and therefore ought to exercise its epistemic rights and responsibilities *constitutes* selfhood. Finally, it would set Heraclitus at the earliest moment in the epistemological tradition, allowing for a new story about the origins of the discipline extending more than a century before Plato.[3]

Yet a complete inquiry into the meaning of the fragment has not yet occurred. The main problem has been the rejection of this fragment from the Heraclitean corpus. Among athetizers or skeptics are both nineteenth-century philologists and twentieth-century philosophers and classicists. Some have assumed that the remark is too epistemically optimistic or democratic for Heraclitus, and so have conjectured that an early doxographer retrojected Socratic views onto his forebear. Others have assumed that that fr. 116 is simply a banal paraphrase of his other and more acute psychological remarks.

As everyone admits, however, no manuscript difficulties support these worries. More importantly, fr. 116 is no more epistemically optimistic than other Heraclitean remarks, in part because 'have a share in' (μέτεστι) does not mean that everybody already has complete self-knowledge. Nor is the language or conception of this fragment anachronistic, since we find parallels across Heraclitus'

[1] Translations are my own; all fragments use Diels-Kranz numbering.

[2] On the status of the Heraclitean soul's reflexivity, see Long 2009, esp. 108; on its physicality, Betegh 2007.

[3] Neither Gerson 2009 nor Bryan 2012, two recent accounts of epistemology's development, address self-knowledge.

work. He speaks elsewhere of the trials of recognition, of self-discovery, of *sôphrosunê*, and human ideals that most humans have yet to attain (e.g., frr. 2, 17, 101, 112).

The desire to resuscitate interest in this fragment, and thus in Heraclitus' epistemology and early work on self-knowledge and self-constitution, motivates this article. I start by showing more precisely the ways in which the arguments against Heraclitean authorship lack good grounds. I then assess the several positive interpretations of the fragment that do exist. Since none of these positive interpretations gives a robust analysis of the fragment, I go on to study Heraclitus' uses of the words constituting fr. 116 in his other fragments. In the process I compare fr. 116 with three other Heraclitean fragments related to self-knowledge. This method thus appeals to two sorts of internal evidence. External evidence about the possibility or novelty of this conception, especially from contemporaries such as Xenophanes and Pindar, awaits another study.

I. Athetizers

I limit my discussion of skepticism of fr. 116 to the scholarship from the past century, but I note that perhaps all nineteenth-century German scholarship denied Heraclitean authorship.[4] Heidel 1913, 714 believes that one of Stobaeus' sources attributed fr. 116, as well as fr. 112, to Heraclitus solely on the basis of fr. 101, 'I searched out myself.' Heidel's argument has two parts. The first and explicit part is that fr. 116 surely references the *gnôthi sauton* and its meaning as 'an injunction to recognize one's limitations and to occupy oneself with that which lies within one's proper scope and power'. Because, according to Heidel, this meaning is Socratic, he infers that the fragment must be post-Socratic. The second and implicit part of the argument is that fr. 101 so captured people's imagination that all later references to reflexive cognitive attitudes must have seemed to them Heraclitean. Yet both parts of Heidel's reasoning are untenable. The first half makes two unsubstantiated and in fact erroneous claims, about the meaning of the *gnôthi sauton* and about the time before which it could not have had that meaning (cf. Moore 2015, 11-31). The second half makes the further unsubstantiated and erroneous assumption that reflexive cognitive attitudes would have seemed plausible only from the mouth of Heraclitus, despite the monumental rise in reflexive use in the fifth century (cf. Havelock 1972; Jeremiah 2012, 77-193).

Kirk 1962, 390 (with 56) treats the fragment as a 'banal paraphrase in the language of late fifth-century ethical investigations' expressed by fr. 2: 'the *logos* being common (ξυνοῦ), most live as if having their own understanding (ἰδίαν… φρόνησιν)'.[5] It is true that thinkers around Socrates took up these questions and

[4] Schleiermacher 1839, Bernays 1850, Lassalle 1858, Schuster 1872. Bywater 1877 sets crosses of uncertainty without further comment. For a brief overview of the scholarship, see Kahn 1979, 117, 120, with nn91-93, 95, and Mouraviev 1999, III.3.b/I 296.

[5] Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1972 do not even mention fr. 116, though they do discuss fr. 101. Guthrie 1962, 417n2, thinks fr. 116 paraphrases fr. 101 instead, and gives a rich reading of that fragment (418–419).

used this language. But Heraclitus also investigated the individuality and publicity of insight and wisdom, and elsewhere in his fragments he uses most of the language found in fr. 116. And the language is common and contemporaneous (Nussbaum 1972, Hussey 1982, Long 2009). Kirk's judgment of banality assumes that the fragment has inadequate novelty, tension, and compression, but he does not in fact show this.

Marcovich 1967, 88-96 also judges fr. 116 to be a paraphrase but adds another fragment to its source.[6] Fr. 114 states: 'in speaking with understanding, one must strengthen oneself (ἰσχυρίζεσθαι) with what is shared by all (τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων), just as a city does with its law, and even more strongly. For all human laws are nourished by a single divine [law]. It dominates as much as it wishes and suffices for all (ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι) and prevails.' Marcovich apparently assumes that fr. 116 gets its reference to what is common to all (μέτεστι πᾶσι) from frr. 2 and 114's ξυνοῦ and τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων, and gets its talk of 'knowing oneself' and 'being sound-minded' from the reference to having access to the *logos* and following the divine law. This is not impossible; but since Marcovich actually gives no reasons for doubting the fragment's authenticity in the first place, his explanation lacks occasion.[7] Heraclitus frequently speaks of the 'common' (ξυνός in frr. 2, 80, 103, 114; ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἔστιν ἓν πάντα in 50; ξυνιᾶσιν in 51), and so he could plausibly do so again in fr. 116. But we might in fact doubt that Stobaeus (or his source) is paraphrasing some other fragment of Heraclitus', as Kirk and Marcovich, among others, have assumed. Likely there are important differences in emphasis between self-knowledge and accessing the *logos*, between *sôphronein* and being influenced by the divine law, and between *metesti* and *xunou*. Furthermore, we might doubt that later authors would reformulate knowing the *logos* as knowing oneself, unless they simply granted the substantial thesis that the *logos* is internal as much as external. Yet Heraclitus appears to warn, in fr. 2, against a version of that substantial thesis, when he warns against relying on one's own subjective experience. Of course, Heraclitus sets as an epistemic goal internalizing the universal *logos* (fr. 1), but the success of this internalization cannot be assumed; what plays out in the internal realm does not necessarily reflect what plays out in the external realm. Indeed, as we will see, self-knowledge might be a precondition for internalizing the *logos*.

As we see, nobody has impugned Stobaeus himself, and there is no evidence that the fragment uses vocabulary unavailable to Heraclitus. Some readers find the sentiment they ascribe to the fragment to be more familiar from later philosophers than from Heraclitus, but this shows neither that they have ascribed the correct sentiment to the fragment nor that the sentiments so ascribed are unique to

[6] Pradeau 2002, 271, follows Kirk and Marcovich closely and doubts that Heraclitus would have used the terms in this fragment to speak about knowledge and self-control. But none of the language is anachronistic.

[7] Dilcher 1995, 21n30, also gives no reasons for his reservations about authenticity but, because he supposes that Heraclitus' 'main idea…shows through', he must find it a reasonable paraphrase of an extant or lost fragment.

those later philosophers. Their conjectures about likely sources of a paraphrase are intriguing but not compelling.[8]

II. Non-skeptics

Other readers, however, have accepted Heraclitean authorship of the fragment, interpreting it in several ways.[9] A century-old perspective takes Heraclitus to share Delphic Apollo's concern to assault hubris, translating the fragment: 'It is the part of all men to know their limitations and be sober.'[10] Undermining this view is uncertainty that the inscription *gnôthi sauton* at the Temple of Apollo at Delphi urged humility and diffidence in this way (see again Moore 2015, 11-31). So while Heraclitus seems on occasion to condemn hubris (fr. 43), drunkenness (fr. 117), great anger (fr. 85), and self-indulgence (fr. 17), we cannot simply assume that he does so as well in the fragments concerned with self-knowledge (frr. 45, 101, 115).

A second perspective attends to the possibility of self-knowledge: Heraclitus is epistemically optimistic, egalitarian in his expectations for human self-discovery (Robinson 1987, 157; Hülsz Piccone 2013, 294-297); or while skeptical about any particular person's ability to know himself in this lifetime, optimistic that metempsychosis will give him enough time eventually to succeed (Tonelli 2005, 139). In these cases, the content of knowing oneself is unimportant except that it is usually thought so difficult as to be accessible only to the elite.

A third perspective treats the call to self-knowledge as identifying the direction toward which to train your attention if you want to know anything at all: 'the most promising place to inquire is within ourselves', and 'while the soul has by nature common reason, it reaches understanding only by the private activity of introspection'.[11] The inner or personal realm contains information or insight

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[8] Mouraviev 1999 agrees. His poetic analysis of the passage at III.3.B/ii 155 adds that it is no off-handed paraphrase. He awards the fragment complete confidence in 'authenticity', 'literality', and 'exactitude'.

[9] Two important works accepting its authenticity without comment: Barnes 1982, 57 and McKirahan 1994, 115 (who makes no note of its questioned authenticity).

[10] Wilkins 1917. Granger 2004, 7-10 (despite 13-14) suggests that Heraclitus would have been deeply influenced by the wisdom of the Seven Sages; Delphic wisdom seems to have come from the Sages.

[11] Graham 2010, 188 with 146-147, speaking in general about fragments thematically related to fr. 116; Mackenzie 1988, 24, commenting on fr. 116 with frr. 115 and 45, and in fact concerned to show Heraclitus' commitment to the unity of opposites even in cognition. McKirahan 2010, 127-128 also distinguishes external from internal investigation—'We gain insight mainly in two ways: inquiry into ourselves (10.33 [= fr. 101]) and inquiry, through correct use of the senses, into the world around us'—but does not use fr. 116 to support this point; he cites fr. 116 only once to make a point about the importance of thought: 'Our ultimate goal is thinking, self-knowledge, and thinking rightly (10.32 [= fr. 116]). To the extent that we attain this insight and wisdom we transcend the human and resemble the divine.' Wheelwright 1959, 27 claims that 'outward search must be accompanied by an inner search, for each self is a microcosm that reflects, in miniscule, the essential nature of reality at large. …One's inward discoveries are not to be cut off from one's discoveries of the outer world, which will always provide the surer basis for knowledge and interpretation.'

inaccessible to those surveying the world around them. Generally, the authors who take up this perspective explain neither the nature of this information, the reason for thinking that it appears most palpably or otherwise best in the inner realm, or what this inner realm includes.

A fourth perspective emphasizes epistemic autonomy. Against the supposedly traditional meaning of *gnôthi sauton* as 'know and then situate yourself into the social hierarchy', Heraclitus is saying that one should rely on one's own judgment. On this view we should read ἑωυτούς as an internal accusative—'know in one's own terms'—rather than as a direct object, and see the testimony that Heraclitus taught himself as consistent with this self-reliance.[12] This assumes that each person has reliable judgment, but it does not explain the source of that reliability. As a grammatical matter, the internal accusative reading seems unlikely: because 'knowing oneself' probably derives from the more familiar 'knowing someone or something else', the maxim seems in fact to contrast direct objects, not modes of knowing.

A fifth perspective is found in Kahn 1979, 116-124, based on frr. 93, 101, 112, and 114. Kahn starts by supposing that the verb in the related fragment 101, δίζημαι ('I search out') means 'to look for [someone missing]'. When Heraclitus says that he looked for himself, he is saying that he looked for his alienated, non-obvious, but true self. Kahn assumes that this true self is 'the common', the 'deeper identity which is that of the universe as a whole'. The common is also the *logos*, 'which is at once right before us but outside our grasp'. Thus with the right sorts of effort, 'both self-knowledge and world knowledge will…converge in [the] comprehension of the common *logos*'. The Delphic precept 'know yourself' practically means, Kahn says, 'Be *sôphrôn*', protect one's thinking; and one secures it to the common to keep it from 'sinking into the private *phronêsis*'. Kahn adds an argument about the relevance of self-knowledge that is dependent on his interpretation of fr. 113, that 'thinking is shared by all (things) [πᾶσι]'. Self-knowledge conduces to knowing the common, the all, because, as a cognitive process, if it knows anything, it knows thinking, and because of fr. 113, 'the universal principle is understood precisely as *thinking*, the activity of an intelligent psyche'.

Kahn's reading glosses 'knowing oneself' in the light of his interpretation of three cognate fragments: as 'knowing the *logos*' (with fr. 101), as 'knowing well' (with fr. 116); and as 'knowing knowing' (with fr. 113). I share Kahn's belief that Heraclitus esteems these three sorts of knowing, and that self-knowledge must amount to more than complacence about one's own beliefs. But Kahn attenuates the significance of the personal reflexive; in glossing 'knowing oneself' with three other objects of knowing, he has erased its grammatical and cultural particularity. By doing this, he has foreclosed three sorts of questions anyone would ask about self-knowledge. To what does 'knowing oneself' testify that

[12] Bollack and Wismann 1972, 321-322 with 288-289, followed by Conche 1987, 227-228, who takes Heraclitus as making an almost Protagorean appeal to self-reliant judgment, and Mouraviev 1999, IV.A 102-103.

simple ‘knowing’ does not? Does knowing oneself require a special kind of work, or take up special objects of attention, or depend on special criteria of validity? If ‘oneself’ counts as a direct object, how do its apparent aspects of individuality, distinctness, and presence matter; and is knowing oneself importantly similar to knowing other people?

Any one of these interpretations of fr. 116 would undermine the charge that it is a ‘banal and weak paraphrase’. But none, in my view, has quite yet made sense of the fragment. Many questions remain to be asked and answered. How if at all does this fragment depend on the meaning of the sage or Delphic precept *gnôthi sauton*? What is Heraclitus’ attitude toward human potential, an attitude that he presumably reveals with the ambiguous *metesti*? What determines the sense and reference of the reflexive ‘oneself’? What is the nature of this self-pertaining knowing? How precisely does knowing oneself relate to *sôphronein*?

We have too little of Heraclitus’ work to elaborate with total precision the details of a systematic theory of self-knowledge. Likely riddling throughout, Heraclitus may have had particular reason to ape the enigmatic Delphic Oracle (fr. 93) when talking about what may have been, by then, a Delphic inscription.[13] All the same, we might reconstruct the core of his account. Heraclitus seems to have set ‘knowing’—or better, ‘recognition’ (*ginôskein*), the true identification of something as an item with practical relevance—at the heart of personal development, seen as epistemic maturation. Knowing or recognizing oneself means recognizing oneself as the sort of being that can come to recognize, despite difficulties and self-blinding, what is true—and to direct one’s life appropriately.

III. Heraclitus’ use of the terms found in fr. 116

Fr. 116 says that knowing oneself and *sôphronein* belong to all humans. Both appear to be strenuous cognitive achievements, worthy or needy of encouragement (North 1966, 1-27). Heraclitus does not readily cede such cognitive triumphs to his fellow man. Indeed, he takes commoners, aristocrats, and intellectuals alike to be blind, delusional, and recalcitrant (cf. Patrick 1888, 616-619). Many of his extant fragments excoriate them for this. People fail to understand the *logos*—which concerns the nature of the world—even once they have heard it; they are oblivious even when awake (frr. 1, 19, 34, 71-73, 107). They stick jealously to their private superstitions (frr. 2, 7, 89). They neither seek nor strive to solve perplexities (frr. 27, 89). They are quick to unearned agreement (fr. 47). They trust untrustworthy authorities (frr. 5, 14, A22-23, 42, 56-57, 104, 106). They believe that mere research confers intelligence (frr. 35, 40, 81, 129). They do not understand the unified nature of wisdom (frr. 32, 41, 50, 108). They do not acknowledge their weaknesses (fr. 121). They sate themselves like live-

[13] Maurizio 2012, esp. 112. Socrates himself is said to have looked over Heraclitus’ composition and then commented that ‘what I understood is impressive (γενναῖα), and <so too>, I think, even what I did not understand; except it needs some Delian diver’ (Diogenes Laertius ii 22). Mouraviev 1999, IV.A 94 is the rare author to admit that we do not know the origins, date of appearance, or first meaning of the *gnôthi sauton*.

stock: they are incurious, unambitious, and unfocused (fr. 29). For those familiar with or sympathetic to Heraclitus' pessimism, Heraclitus' counterintuitive claim that everyone partakes in self-knowledge and high virtue suggests something complex at play. The reader must seek this deeper and more consistent, if also more paradoxical, interpretation (cf. Kahn 1979, 6-8, 89-95; Mackenzie 1988; Adomenas 1999; Nightingale 2007, 183-189).

ἀνθρωποῖσι πᾶσι

Heraclitus specifies 'for all humans' (ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι) rather than just 'for all'. He uses the word for human, *anthrôpos*, or its related adjectives, in twenty fragments. Half the time he uses the term as a contrast category, either with gods (frr. 24, 30, 53, 78, 83, 102, 114) or with lesser beings, such as apes, children, or fish (frr. 61, 70, 82-83). In these cases he draws attention to whatever is uniquely human, and especially to humanity's relative inferiority and superiority. In the majority of the remaining ten cases, Heraclitus specifically identifies weaknesses humans could avoid: failing to understand or to skirt deception, foolishness, or impiety, or to be sated or unprepared for death.[14] It seems, then, that Heraclitus specifies *anthrôpos* when he wants to draw attention to the human propensity to do worse than necessary. That laziness might derive from forgetting that, since we are not gods, we are not already perfect. None of the fragments with *anthrôpos* discourage striving for improvement or seeking to narrow the span between men and gods. Their generally strident tone suggests the opposite, that we should be ashamed about ossifying that distance. This reading of *anthropoisi pasi* is reinforced by the reading of *metesti* that the next paragraphs defend. Heraclitus is saying that humans tend to fail to achieve a level of self-knowledge that their nature, between beasts and gods, would allow them and from which they would benefit.

μέτεστι

Those who find fr. 116 impossibly sunny assume that *metesti*, 'have a share in', means 'possess or exemplify right now', akin to *metechei* or *echei*. The verb can mean this. But no ancient philosopher believed that all men know themselves—if he even thought knowledge possible at all—or that all are *sôphrônein* at the present moment.[15] Thus this is an implausible primary translation of the Heraclitus fragment. It is certainly not evidence that the fragment has been misattributed or constructed. Something less Pollyannaish is called for. Herodotus, another writer of Ionic Greek, uses the term *metesti* to mean 'have a claim or access to'.[16] This gives a more sensible reading of Heraclitus' fragment: 'All

[14] Frr. 1, 14, 27, 56, 87, 107, 110-111. The other fragments with *anthrôpos*-group words are 3, 26, 119, 129. Heraclitus' three uses of *anêr*, at 35, 79, 117, follow no obvious pattern.

[15] See recently Bryan 2012 on epistemic fallibilism in Heraclitus' contemporary Xenophanes.

[16] Hdt. i 171 (the Carians have a shrine access to which they give to Mysians and Lydians, as to a brother, on grounds of their ethnic connection); see also LSJ sv II and Dilcher 1995, 21. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1292a1-3, using the same verb, speaks of forms of democracy where all have 'a share' in govern-

humans *have a claim or access to* knowing themselves and *sôphronein*.'[17] According to this reading, not everyone yet possesses his full share of self-knowledge, but everyone, given his nature as a human, can or ought to gain it. This reasoning is supported by the equally surprising fr. 113: 'thinking is common to all' (ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονέειν).[18]

If Heraclitus takes the effort to assert that we can know ourselves—that we are neither utterly opaque to ourselves nor utterly incorrigible—then he presumably thinks that we do not yet know ourselves enough. And the fact that self-knowledge is not just available to us but is also proper to our human nature gives a norm to us: we *ought* to know ourselves more.[19] Heraclitus' exasperation with his neighbors and illustrious rivals seems to find its bitterness in the fact that people are not condemned to live so benightedly, in such self-ignorance. The urgency in fr. 116 seems to come from our responsibility for avoiding this self-directed delinquency.[20]

But if self-knowledge (and *sôphronein*) is universally available, and good, and something we have only incompletely attained, why would Heraclitus need to encourage us to pursue it further? Probably because we mistakenly think we already know as much as we could about ourselves. After all, no distance obscures the view.[21] Further, many or all of us probably think that we can do what we want, and are therefore sound-minded. So we believe that we possess (μέτεστι) self-knowledge—glossing the word with its most frequent meaning—and that we *sôphronein*. And probably we do possess *some* of both. But that very possession may blind us from clearer self-vision, from realizing that our self-knowledge is superficial, our sound-mindedness shallow. Thus Heraclitus may intend the very ambivalence in the verb *metesti* that has confounded interpretation. All people actually do have a modicum of self-knowledge. Their realization of this deludes them into sitting comfortably in their state of only minimal enlightenment. Having some self-knowledge preempts their having enough self-knowledge.[22] The way up is the way down: knowing yourself (that you know something about yourself) leads to deluding yourself, and deluding yourself (into thinking you have made little progress) leads to knowing oneself.

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ing; he does not mean that all govern simultaneously.

[17] Examples of translations meant to capture something similar: 'it belongs to all men to…' (Kahn 1979), 'it is for all men to' (Mackenzie 1988), 'a claim to' (Robinson 1987), 'pertains' (Patrick 1888, Wheelwright 1959, 19), 'tocca in sorte' (Tonelli 2005), 'concesso è' (Walzer 1939), 'il est dévolu de' (Bollack and Wismann 1972), 'c'est l'héritage légué' (Bouchart d'Orval 1997, 210), and by Conche 2011: 'de tous les hommes, c'est la part', 'il appartient', and 'échoit'.

[18] Vlastos 1955, 344-347 defends this fragment's authenticity against Kirk and Marcovich.

[19] Is this a self-directed version of Aristotle *Meta.* i 1.980a1: πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ορέγονται φύσει?

[20] Hussey 1999, 103-104 observes that Heraclitus thinks we have a choice to become better, but also that the conflict between self-knowledge and self-delusion in us is 'presumably…isomorphic to' cosmic conflict.

[21] Cf. Ion of Chios fr. 55, Xenophon *Mem.* iv 2.24, Plato *Alc.* 129a5; see generally Moore 2015.

[22] I owe Ron Polansky thanks for discussions about Heraclitus' intentional ambivalence.

γινώσκειν

Heraclitus uses the cognitive verb *ginôskein* throughout his extant fragments.[23] While I have been using the familiar translation 'to know', probably the English verbs 'to recognize' or 'acknowledge' provide better translations. This is consistent with pre-Heraclitean uses of the word.[24] 'To recognize', like 'to acknowledge', means identifying something correctly in a way that bears normative force. I might have learned the content of my city's law, and thus be able to describe its contours; but when I acknowledge that something is the law for me, I correctly identify a social norm *as* law and thus as binding and determinative of my actions. When I recognize my friend, I identify this person *as* my friend and thus as a person to whom certain duties are due. The contrast is with other veridical attitudes, such as 'noting' or 'being familiar with' or 'having information about'. Heraclitus' verb *ginôskein*, we will see, involves a fitting appreciation of something *as* a particular sort of thing and thus of its practical weight.

Heraclitus' most revealing use of *ginôskein* is in his three-clause excoriation of the delusive life. 'Most people do not understand (φρονέουσι) such things as they encounter (ἐγκυρέουσιν), nor having learned (μαθόντες) do they recognize (γινώσκουσιν) [sc. what they have learned?], but they seem to themselves (ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι) [sc. to do so?]' (fr. 17). This remark has the ring of a riddle, like the fragment about Homer and the fleas, or Hesiod and the unity of night and day (frr. 56, 57), the latter discussed below. Solving the riddle requires that we give a closer analysis of the difference between these easily-conflated cognitive terms. The common failure denounced here is a self-satisfied attitude about the degree to which one appreciates the import of one's own experiences.

Most people think they know exactly what they have been through, as though *pathei mathos* were universally true. Heraclitus responds that time and passive reception do not themselves enlighten, and his fragment gives triple voice to the paradox of human epistemic negligence. First, 'encountering' something does not suffice for 'understanding', since it is too particular and private (cf. fr. 2). This recalls Heraclitus' opening sally that many people seem unfamiliar (ἀπείροισιν) with the *logoi* he goes through, even though they have experienced (πειρώμενοι) them in word and deed (fr. 1). Second, 'learning' does not suffice for 'recognizing', since it does not render the skill or lesson practically salient. This recalls Heraclitus' opposition between 'much learning' (πολυμαθίη) and 'understanding' (νόον) in frr. 40 (cf. fr. 129). Third, not only does brute intake differ from proper uptake, but people ignore this difference and believe that they under-

[23] He uses the verb only in the progressive; he also uses a related noun in frr. 56 (discussed below) and 78.

[24] Lesher 1981, 8-11, 14; Lesher 1994, 7-8. The following account of Heraclitean γνῶσις yields a result similar to that found in Lesher 1983, 159-163: 'γνῶναι and γιγνώσκειν… [mean] knowing not just who or what something is, but what this means, what its signficance is, what the larger situation is, or what the facts really are'. I emphasize that Heraclitus' uses of the term always include a strong normative dimension, even if that dimension is not by necessity in the word itself.

stand and recognize when they do not.[25] We readily see the contrast between ἑωυτοῖσι δοκέουσι and γινώσκειν ἑωυτούς of fr. 115. The possibility of mistaken self-assessment suggests that understanding and recognizing involve acknowledging something for the way it really is, and having the way it really is matter, rather than going with first impressions, whatever they may be, and letting those impressions reinforce one's current expectations. One can presume to understand how something really is but have failed to verify that presumption. Both acknowledgment and understanding are kinds of 'seeing as', a unifying of some experience under the aegis of something already (or soon to be even more) meaningful.

Ginôskein-cognates arise in a number of additional fragments, each confirming a translation as 'recognition' or 'acknowledgment' construed as above. Most straightforward is: 'dogs bark at those they do not know (γινώσκωσι)' (fr. 97), where recognition would change their entire orientation, from alert warnings to companionable tail-wagging. More interesting is: 'The teacher (διδάσκολος) of most people is Hesiod: they know (ἐπίστανται) him to know (εἰδέναι) most, he who did not recognize (ἐγίνωσκεν) day and night: for they are one' (fr. 57).[26] Again we have a riddle. Hesiod did not acknowledge the unity of day and night, giving them distinct identities in *Theogony* 128 and 724, misled as he was by the superficial experience of differences in light intensity or by mythological tradition. Heraclitus signals the importance of 'recognition' by setting it near three other cognition terms. The unity of the day is significant in two ways: abstractly, as a representative of singularity out of polarity, and concretely, as actually the way humans mark the passage of time (Kahn 1979, 108-110). Hesiod got dazzled by the apparent differences, thought he accounted for those differences in a clever way, and in the process ignored the deep connections.

In another fragment, Heraclitus generalizes Hesiod's error: 'Beliefs [are what] the most reputed one recognizes, maintains (δοκέοντα ὁ δοκιμώτατος γινώσκει, φυλάσσει)' (fr. 28a).[27] Those treated as intellectual authorities mistake their reputation as an imprimatur for their perspective. Thus they take as true and important, and retain as warranted and reliable, what they have actually failed to recognize in a clearer light.[28]

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[25] On the verb *dokeô*, consider fr. 27: 'What awaits men at death they do not expect or even suppose (δοκέουσιν).'

[26] Similarly, fr. 106 has Heraclitus judging Hesiod as 'ignorant (ἀγνοοῦντι) of the single nature of each day'. Now on fr. 57 see Lesher 2016.

[27] Alternative but similar translations: 'What the most esteemed man recognizes and defends is <mere> imaginings' (Kahn); 'The knowledge of the most famous persons, which they guard, is but opinion' (McKirahan). γινώσκει, φυλάσσει follows DK, with a parallel from Hippocrates *de vict. ac. morb.* 11, τόδε γε μὴν καὶ φύλασσουσι καὶ γινώσουσιν, ὅτι μεγάλην βλάβην φέρει… By contrast, Clement has γινώσκει φυλάσσειν, and Schleiermacher proposed γινώσκειν φυλάσσει.

[28] For a contrasting interpretation, see Sider 2013, 327, who, following Clement's text, translates 'the person whose *doxa* is greatest knows how to hold onto his beliefs' (taking γινώσκει as 'knows how to' from Soph. *Ant.* 1089, γνῷ τρέφειν). He notes that this could yield both a positive and a pejorative reading.

Of course, that clear light need not be so much brighter than it already is: 'Men are deceived in the recognition of what is *obvious* (ἐξηπάτηνται οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν τῶν φανερῶν), just as Homer was, who was wisest of all the Greeks' (fr. 56). How can we fail to recognize the obvious unless we have focused on something other than what is in front of us? Mystery initiates 'pray to images as if they were talking with houses, not recognizing (γινώσκων) what gods or even heroes are like' (fr. 5; see also Adomenas 1999, 101-106).

Heraclitus abstracts from these observations about famous men and commoners to state a basic thesis of his intellectual project: 'of all those whose accounts I have heard, none has gone so far as this: to recognize (γινώσκειν) that [the] wise is set apart from all' (fr. 108). The understanding for which people ought to seek, and that will be decisive, is distinct from whatever it is that people usually look for to direct their lives (cf. frr. 86, 97).

As our reading of these fragments shows, Heraclitus' remarks about 'recognition', among the most interesting of his fragments, treat humans as regularly failing to appreciate the reality and significance of their perceptions or experiences. What is to be recognized is often *right there*: that day and night are one, for example, and what is otherwise 'obvious'. Yet, of course, it is easier to neglect your ignorance of what is right there than what is notoriously difficult to find. Failing to recognize is failing to make the correct sense of what you see; since you see it anyway, it is easy to settle for your current appraisal. We might summarize by saying that for Heraclitus, *ginôskein* is to be contrasted with believing or perceiving or observing; it is, in an important way, an epistemically and intellectually superior state.

ἑωυτούς

The next step in reading fr. 116 is to understand the 'oneself'—considered both as a reflexive and as the locus of individuality—that all men could severally know or recognize. This is in pointed contrast with *ta panta* ('everything') or *to sophon* ('what is wise') or *eu* ('well'). From the pragmatic perspective, as Jeremiah 2012, 26, 45, 54, 120, etc. has recently argued, reflexive pronouns express surprise, either that the focal object is one's own rather than someone else's, or that the focal action is self-directed rather than other-directed. The middle voice, after all, expresses familiar reflexivity (e.g., choosing for oneself). From the semantic perspective, the specific content of the reflexive is determinable in several ways, depending on the verb, subject, and context. A survey of Heraclitus' fragments shows that he uses the full pragmatic and syntactic resources of the reflexive pronoun for his philosophical and rhetorical ends.

The reflexive pronoun, obviously coreferential at least to an extent with the subject, takes some of its meaning from the subject. But the subject is not itself always sharply defined. Sometimes only the grammatical person is specified. Even were there an explicit subject, its salient aspect might not specified. Accordingly, the content of the reflexive pronoun may gain specificity in other ways. Only certain things can be the proper object of the relevant verb. In the

sentence ‘I wash myself’, the content of ‘myself’ is restricted to the washable parts, my skin. In ‘I teach myself’, the ‘myself’ now refers to the part that can learn. ‘I wash and teach myself’ is sylleptic; the ‘myself’ is written as one word but must be read as having two distinct meanings at once. The reflexive object may gain specificity in another way. The object, coreferential with the subject, may be constrained in whatever way the subject is constrained. Subjects under only some aspects may perform the actions attributed to them. The nature of the reflexive object, in this second case, depends on the nature of the subject that acts upon it.

Heraclitus uses the reflexive in all these ways. Pythagoras, in the course of his intense research, cherry-picked writings from which he made up his ‘own’ wisdom (ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, fr. 129). Heraclitus expresses scorn at this bricolage (πολυμαθείην; cf. frr. 40, 81). By calling it ‘evil trickery’ (κακοτεχνίην), he suggests that Pythagoras did not openly admit to his reliance on others’ insights (cf. Huffman 2008, 43). He also suggests that Pythagoras, in treating a portion of wisdom as his own, ascribes to himself the ludicrous status of wisdom-proprietor. This is ludicrous, Heraclitus seems to believe, because wisdom is a common and universal feature of the world to which we may all aspire (frr. 1, 2, 30, 32, 41, 50, 89, 108, 114 with 113). The critical power of this fragment thus comes out fully when we see the manifold ironies to which the reflexive pronoun alludes, given the multiple ways in which something may be one’s own (cf. Plato *Charmides* 161b6-163e1).

In his most explicit criticism of his countrymen (fr. 121), Heraclitus states that the Ephesians deserve to be hung for driving out, not a foreigner, but the very best of themselves (ἑωυτῶν), and reiterates the reflexive when he imagines their guiding rule: ‘Among us (ἡμέων), let nobody be most beneficial.’ This self-purgation is sociologically interesting. It may also undermine itself. If a member of the group is liable to be driven out by his own neighbors simply for a quality of his very membership (being best), then over time every member of that group is equally susceptible to exile, someone always being the best after each purge (Kahn 1979, 178-179). So the subject ‘Ephesians’, co-referenced by the reflexive pronouns ‘of them’ and ‘of us’, takes on a meaning of ‘we, being drive-out-able’, and thus so do the reflexive pronouns themselves. The rational choice solution to everyone being liable to exile is that everyone strives not to be the best. This would lead to a city’s serious mediocrity, and perhaps even a loss of the very political unity assumed by the reflexive pronouns. So again, Heraclitus deploys the reflexive pronoun not just in a surprising but also semantically complex way: the ‘themselves’ gets its content from the joint political action the Ephesians engage in, and it is that political action itself that may dissolve any possible unity to which the ‘themselves’ is meant to refer.

We have already looked at fr. 17 for its use of *ginôskein*; it also includes a reflexive pronoun: ‘Most people do not understand such things as they encounter, nor having learned do they recognize, but they seem to themselves (ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι).’ That is to say, they may not seem so to others, but since they are the

ones judging, others' views do not matter.

The most famous reflexive in Heraclitus comes from his summary view of the world, one compounding opposition and unity (fr. 51, with Vlastos 1955, 348-351; Jeremiah 2012, 86-87). Heraclitus says that people 'do not understand how a thing differing with itself, agrees [with itself] (διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει): a back-turning harmony'. Here, since there is no explicit subject, the reflexive gets its meaning solely from the structure of the clause: it is whatever is different from the thing with which it differs—namely, itself—and so it is a self-differing thing; but it is also a self-agreeing thing. Not only are the ideas of self-difference and self-agreement strange; the meaning of the 'itself' comes exclusively from the nature of the implied subject with which it is coreferential (something that *may* differ and agree with things) and the nature of the action to which it is object (*being differed from* and *being agreed with*). This fragment shows the intensity of Heraclitus' attention to reflexives and the details of their use. A thing being something itself is put in question: whether it can be, or even must be, self-contradictory.

Two more uses of the reflexive pronoun appear to pertain specifically to self-knowledge. Most notable is Heraclitus' fr. 101, 'I sought out myself (ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν).' We may read this with fr. 22: 'Those searching for gold dig up much earth and find little (χρυσὸν οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον).' The verb δίζημαι probably means here to seek one thing out from among many ultimately irrelevant items, wheat among chaff.[29] Seeking oneself out thus implies undergoing a challenge, sorting through flak, seeking an unusual object—oneself. The surprise comes from the fact that we do not generally think that we need to *seek* ourselves, since we think we are *obviously right here*. It is hardly remarkable that, just as nearly everyone fails to recognize his experiences for what they are, nearly everyone would also start by failing to have already found himself. Of course, it may not be obvious *what* counts as oneself (or whether there even is something to which this reflexive pronoun refers), and so we may have to rely on a few clues when we are looking around. This is what we have to look for: what corresponds to the term 'myself'. What we can say about this self, from Heraclitus' remarks, is that it is something that can be sought:

[29] LSJ sv A. Guthrie 1962 gives three meanings of fr. 101; Robinson 1987, 147 summarizes five possible interpretations. Marcovich 1967, 53-58 and Tonelli 2005, 199 understand δίζημαι as querying oneself, as of the Oracle; this view seems to imply, questionably, that Heraclitus also riddles *himself*. Diogenes Laertius ix 5 says that Heraclitus inquired of himself alone, not others, and was thus his own teacher. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1977, 204, 211 treat 'searching out oneself' as discovery of one's physical nature, the way in which the soul ranges outside oneself and is connected structurally and materially with the world: the soul is a portion of the vast cosmic fire and the possessor of soul partakes in some part of the fire's directive power. Kahn 1979, 116 takes the view that Heraclitus is looking for his 'true self'; yet one wonders what in Heraclitus' language denotes this 'true self'. Pritzl 1985, 308 treats the reflexive as identifying a repository of (personal) experience on which one draws on the path to knowledge. Long 2001, 27 says that 'the cosmic order that [Heraclitus] discovered—a universe governed by divine *logos*—offered itself as a startlingly new paradigm for what to make of oneself: a *microcosm* of psychological balance, self-measurement, internal control, and beauty'. For older perspectives, see Patrick 1888, 607-610.

which means, simultaneously, that there *is* something there, or at least eventually could be, but that it is not an obvious sort of thing. Perhaps we can also say that it is something that *seeks*: after all, since Heraclitus does not say he seeks part of himself, his seeking (or the preconditions of that seeking) may be among the traits of the self sought out. The self he sought may be curious, may feel incomplete, may not always be in total command of its faculties, may be merely promissory. These conjectures are not idle. One cannot find something if one has no idea what to look for,[30] and so Heraclitus, to the extent he wants to encourage his readers to go in search of themselves, must help them figure out what to look for. He knows that we can rely on nothing but what the fragment could, maximally, tell us. Heraclitus uses the rich resources of a reflexive pronoun paired with a cognitive verb, set in the context of a surprise that spurs puzzle-resolution, to do this.

Finally, in a passage dubiously attributed to Heraclitus, since Stobaeus (3.1.180a) in fact attributes it to Socrates, we read that 'Belonging to the soul is a *logos* increasing itself (ἑαυτόν)' (fr. 115).[31] This fragment allows us to ask: what is a *logos* such that it is both increasable and a source of increase? We may be inclined to hear here the idea of self-consciousness or maturation, the taking as an object of reflection that faculty of reflection itself, and having the faculty thereby expand. A self-increasing 'report',[32] for example, would be a flexible one, able to report on its own existence, and on its ability to self-report, and so on. This mode of recursion seems an apt description, phenomenologically speaking, of the increasingly capacious soul (see Robb 1986, 338-339; Long 2009, 102; Jeremiah 2012, 83-86).

We can now summarize our findings about Heraclitus' use of reflexive pronouns. He appears never to use them as internal accusatives but as proper objects. He uses no locution that maps to 'true self', but he allows that what the self is, or what something itself is, may not be obvious; first impressions may provide only an illusory and not true self. Selfhood can be a unified diversity, a contradiction somehow held together. Whatever the arrangement is that holds that contradiction together may simultaneously account for the *world*'s unity. Possibly seeking oneself out helps constitute the self that one seeks (as a seeker, etc.) and that comprehending a back-turning thing makes it a self, such that while selfhood may not always be constituted by some activity, it may sometimes be. (It may be that Heraclitus himself constitutes the concept 'selfhood' in the midst of his theorizing about self-knowledge; this would be interesting to those who believe 'selfhood' is a concept that arises relatively late in classical Greek philosophy.)

[30] Regarding another time in the history of philosophy, Shoemaker 1963, 74-75 argues that Humean skeptics about the self fail to discover a self because they prevent themselves from forming any picture of their object of discovery.

[31] Diels attributed it to Heraclitus because of its similarity to fr. 45 (λόγος τῆς ψυχῆς) and its relationship to sayings in the Hippocratic corpus. Though one might also find the line unduly paradoxical and abstract for the Socrates familiar to us, it has an approximate parallel in Plato *Phaedrus* 276e6-277a4.

[32] Kahn 1979's favored translation of *logos*.

γινώσκειν ἑωυτούς

What may we infer from these Heraclitean instances of the reflexive personal pronoun, especially for our understanding of 'knowing oneself'? The reflexive pronoun sometimes engenders severe paradox; but in Heraclitus these paradoxes seem never to lead to gross impossibility. The pronoun retains its grammatical sense as coreferential with the subject. But it does not rely merely on that coreferentiality for its specificity. It assumes a thing unified enough to be referred to and that bears the properties appropriate to both object and actor of the action for which it is object.

When reading fr. 116, we may be surprised by the notion of something recognizing itself. We are accustomed, even from reading the other fragments of Heraclitus, to think that one recognizes *other* facts, people, or concepts; indeed, we are to recognize the structure of the *cosmos*. But the surprise is not insurmountable; we can accept that there is some *me* that I could recognize, or fail to recognize, or work on recognizing, just as there are experiences, values, and authorities that I could recognize, fail to recognize, or work on recognizing. So the self might be epistemically akin to the other things I could recognize or fail to recognize. But what else do I know about this self? Since it is identical, somehow, to its coreferential subject, it may belong as well to the class of things that can *recognize*. It need not, of course; the skin I wash cannot itself wash anything. But if Heraclitus wants his readers to succeed at interpreting his fragments, and if 'oneself' would otherwise be underdetermined, it is reasonable to suppose that he encourages a liberal interpretation of the reflexive pronoun. Heraclitus' 'oneself', then, plausibly unifies recognizability and the capacity to recognize. 'Recognizing oneself' would mean, therefore, acknowledging oneself correctly as something recognizable and *as* something that can and therefore ought to recognize, not simply going on first impressions or on external authority, instead building up its own epistemic authority.[33]

Though Heraclitus does not spell it out, were the underlying sense of 'recognize yourself' the charge to discover one's recognizability and capacity to recognize, he could expect his readers to discover several important corollaries. Acknowledgment of recognizability has three facets. First, it requires that there be, or come to be, *something* there. Recognition realizes, posits, or assumes something unified. Coming to recognize *oneself* means giving up on the idea that there is nothing that one is, that there are simply impulses that pass adventitiously through the space of one's body. Of course, we start out only imperfectly unified, and so we start out only imperfectly recognizing ourselves. Coming more completely to recognize oneself requires unifying oneself. (Self-recognition or self-knowledge is aspirational in two ways, requiring a person to improve his ability both to recognize and to be the sort of thing that can be recognized.)

[33] Crystal 2002, 1-48, works out the paradoxes of self-intellection during the time of Heraclitus, but does not discuss Heraclitus or the idea of recognition. On a resolution of the Heraclitean paradox of self-knowledge and self-search, emphasizing the continuity with all the Heraclitean paradoxes, focusing on temporality, see Miller 2011, 27-29, 32, 41-42.

The second facet of acknowledging recognizability is acknowledging that because the self is the sort of thing that can be recognized, it can also be misrecognized. That is to say, it requires recognizing that self-delusion is possible. Delusion occurs about things that are easily ignored or forgotten or mistaken. Heraclitus' other fragments suggest that people usually give over their attention to a variety of fantasies, in the form of a haphazard variety of impulses and desires. These impulses and opinions present themselves immediately to people, and so it is on their basis that people act. In doing so they misrecognize themselves. When a unified self is recognized, by contrast, they take a certain principle of unity as having practical significance; it, not the pleasure of the moment, provides the only good grounds for belief and action.

The third facet of this acknowledgment is the recognition of selfhood as something to recognize. (Though such an idea is not usually thought to exist in the early fifth century, I think Heraclitus is pointing at it.) This thing—an idea or concept—is derived from the reflexive pronoun 'oneself', the thing that is being identified as the object of knowledge or recognition. The Heraclitean seeker after self-knowledge will have to seek after an understanding of the self as such, that is, of what will count as having identified the right sort of thing.

In sum, acknowledging one's recognizability involves there being a potentially-unified something (where potentially-unified need not mean potentially-simple) to recognize; the possibility of failing to recognize that unified something and putting something else—disunified impulses, for example—in its place; and knowing what a self is, such that one could possibly recognize an instance of it.

Acknowledgment of the *capacity* to recognize anything would involve several other factors. Being able to recognize means, at the same time, being something that can fail to recognize. This demands humility and diffidence, and a desire to learn how seeing, thinking, and knowing work. It also means being something that is governed by norms, norms both standing and activated by concrete and particular situations (coming upon a friend in town, for example). This involves a sense of temporal extension and embeddedness in a world of significant value. Third, it means being something that can keep one eye on the perceptual details and one eye on one's previous or ongoing conceptual understandings. This requires a merging of practical and theoretical appreciation. Fourth, it means being something that can improve, which in taking better cognizance of its world comes to have a truer, more stable, more intelligent nature. In sum, again, to acknowledge one's capacity to recognize involves taking up the moral and intellectual responses to recognition-failure, being norm-governed, seeking particular and abstract information simultaneously, and being improvable.

This list of features is easily expanded or reduced. Most simply, recognizing oneself requires seeking a self that may be recognized as an improvable epistemic subject. This is an aspirational goal, and from this perspective the final feature above, 'being improvable', is central. Reading Heraclitus' work might inform someone about the ways to improve, but this would have to be paired with

the idiosyncratic experience one has of oneself and the effort one applies to oneself. Together these may lead to self-recognition.

σωφρονεῖν

As the final step in interpreting fr. 116, we must make some sense of *sôphronein*. By the time Plato wrote his dialogues, we know that the Greeks associated self-knowledge with sound-mindedness; later compilations of sage wisdom attest to the same. But we have no direct evidence that the 'know yourself' and 'be *sôphron*' were traditionally linked, even if γνῶθι σαυτόν and μήδεν ἄγαν were eventually inscribed adjacently at Delphi.[34] After all, sound-mindedness may mean something other than 'nothing in excess'. At fr. 112, Heraclitus says that 'being sound-minded is the greatest virtue and wisdom, speaking and doing true things—having perceived what is in accordance with nature' (σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίοντας). The punctuation and interpretation is difficult; little argument can rest on it (see Kahn 1979, 116-123; Long 2009, 92-100). What we can say is that *sôphronein* describes human excellence, is akin to wisdom, orients itself in both thought and action toward truth, and recognizes the way things really are. This fragment thus presents *sôphronein* in much the same way as fr. 116 presents knowing oneself: as a matter of acknowledging the truth about oneself, and disregarding idiosyncratic self-deception, in the process of becoming fully human.

The *kai* linking 'knowing themselves' and 'being sound-minded' is liable to several interpretations. It could be that the conjuncts are similarly normative for humans and similarly assumed already to be in a person's possession. It could be that they are in fact the same, one presented from the epistemic perspective and the other from the dispositional perspective. Of course, they could also merely seem the same but actually differ in important ways. Probably the best reading of the fragment allows each to illuminate the other. This is especially important for *sôphronein*, which Plato, for one, shows is a virtue not at all easy to understand, and whose sheer boringness, compared to courage and piety, may cause us to undervalue it.

It would seem, then, that fr. 116, 'All people have a share in knowing themselves and being sound-minded', expresses optimism about human possibility. But the flip side of optimism is the normative compulsion to realize one's humanity. If we each have a share or a claim, then we have the obligation to instantiate that share and claim. Such acquisition takes recognizing myself: discerning the extent to which my beliefs about myself match the way I really am, and seeking to acknowledge only the reality of myself as myself. This is a strain, a seemingly depersonalizing and publicizing task, but it is a deeply individual one at the same time. To seek to know oneself is also to seek to become *sôphrôn*: fully virtuous, wise, correctly acting, correctly believing, and self-aware of one's nature.

A piece of evidence in favor of this interpretation of self-knowledge comes

[34] Kahn 1979, 116 assumes there is a traditional pairing; but see North 1966, 1-31.

from Heraclitus' remarks about the soul. It would be rash to assert that the *soul* is the recognizer and the recognized described above; and proving it would take an article as long as this one. But Heraclitus' description of soul as locus of reasoning suggests something like this (Nussbaum 1972; Robinson 1986, 305-308, 311; Robb 1986; Schofield 1991; Long 2001, 26-27, and Long 2009). Betegh 2009 has recently re-edited fr. 45, about the limits of the soul: 'He who travels every road will not find out the limits of the soul [as he goes], so deep a *logos* does it/he have' (ψυχῆς πείρατα [ἰών] οὐκ ἄν ἐξεύροι ὁ πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει). This fragment, like many other Heraclitean statements, asserts that only the person working hard to learn about himself, taking each route systematically, will learn something truly valuable (see Marcovich 1967, 365-370, for the history of interpretation). Heraclitus' remark about 'every' road suggests that Heraclitus takes self-investigation to involve something more piecemeal and laborious than the intuition of, for example, an abstract structure. It also suggests that one learns about one's soul—that is, oneself?—only in the practice of exploration, not through listening to some theoretical lesson. In just the same way, only the actually adventurous sailor discovers that he cannot find out the bounds of the ocean (cf. Robb 1986, 334-338).

IV. Conclusion

I have shown that for Heraclitus, 'knowing oneself' may have a deep meaning connected to recognizing oneself as a unified or unifiable epistemic agent capable of recognizing (and failing to recognize) and of being recognized (and misrecognized). Heraclitus preserves the riddle of Delphi. He demands from his readers much work of self-searching simply to start trying to obey the injunction. This work calls for self-transformation, being prepared to acknowledge the epistemically-active self as something aspirational, not something given (cf. Hussey 1982, 45-52; McKirahan 2010, 141-144; Long 2015, 83-84).

There is no doubt that Heraclitus finds important parallels between understanding the *cosmos* and understanding the self, as those who have supported the authenticity of fr. 116 have generally argued; both require interpretation as conflicts in unity, and both participate in the same *logos*. But we should not explain away self-knowledge as an *instance* of knowing the *cosmos*. Knowing oneself is not knowing just any old thing, even something as important as the nature of the world. Knowing oneself involves working on oneself, making oneself into a thing that can recognize (i.e., follow epistemic norms) and be recognized (i.e., follow norms of unification).

Taking this seriously has positive consequences both for ancient philosophy and for contemporary investigations into self-knowledge. On the ancient side, we gain a richer notion of self-directed epistemic obligation. The concept of 'recognition', with its aspects of sensitivity and 'seeing as (significant)', gains importance. Selfhood becomes an object not merely of passive acceptance or appreciation but of effortful construction and truth-orientation. On the contemporary side, we gain reason to think that self-knowledge ought to be taken as more

than ready access to one's occurrent beliefs or even one's stable dispositions.[35] We have to consider what it means to take self-*knowledge* as knowledge of the *self*, at which point the very relationship between selfhood and the mental or psychological items familiar to epistemological studies of self-knowledge becomes salient. Questions familiar in the self-knowledge literature, about immediacy and infallibility, come to be joined by questions of discrimination, judgment, and endorsement.

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[35] This limited view is standard in the epistemological literature, as for example in Gertler 2011, Cassam 2015.

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